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Abstract
The ‘Abbasid  caliphate in the fourth/tenth century suffered from a sharp
economic decline. This was the result of  several factors, mainly civil wars, the
Zanj and Qarmatian revolts, political interference by the Turkish and
Daylamite soldiers, military iqt\a>‘  and the activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n. The
civil wars had a destructive effect on the city of  Baghdad and its citizens,
ruined most of  the land and caused a devaluation of  dirham and di>na>rs.
The revolts of  the Zanj and Qarmatians paralyzed trade in southern Iraq
leading to a stagnation of  currency and the banking system and a decrease in
financial activity. The involvement of  the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers in
politics, and rivalries among them to gain power, led to the devastation of
canals, dams and consequently ruined the agricultural sector. In addition, the
introduction of  military iqt\a>‘ during this period resulted in the damage of
cultivated lands due to their excessive exploitation and abandonment of  their
irrigation system. Finally, the activities of  the ‘ayya>ru>n in looting merchants’
goods, burning many houses, and killing people, inflicted considerable loss on
the merchants,  encouraging the latter to leave Baghdad and do business in
other cities.
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Many Muslim people lament the annihilation of  the ‘Abbasid  by
the  Hulagu in 1250. The cruelty that the Mongols committed upon the
people in Baghdad and the story of  the heaps of  human skulls and
blackened river of  thousands of  burnt books, still lingers in the minds
of  Muslims. The empire that had made them proud had declined and
finally was annihilated by the Mongol army. They wondered why the
empire which reached its golden era during the reign of  Ha>ru>n al-Rashi>d
and his son al-Ma’mu>n could be easily destroyed by the Mongols.
Generally many Muslims know that after the reign of  al-Ma’mu>n’s
successors, the empire sharply declined and there emerged many petite
dynasties in the east and west of  the empire. They know that the
emergence of  the petite dynasties was first due to the weakness of  the
central government and the spirit of  tribalism and regionalism which
encouraged people in the west and the east, in particular, those who
were ‘ajam (non-Arab), to get rid of  the ‘Abbasid control and found
their own dynasties.  However, there were actually some factors which
weakened the ‘Abbasid empire, particularly economic factors, that very
few people know of.
This paper will elaborate the economic factors that led to the
decline of  the ‘Abbasids. However, before elaborating these factors, first
it will look at the extent of  the available sources relating to the economy
of  the empire, next it discusses the general economic background of
the caliphate, and then analyzes some factors that lead to the economic
decline. These factors include civil wars, uprising, interference in politics
by soldiers, military iqt\a>‘1 and the activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n.2 The elaboration
of  these factors is expected to shed light on the failure of  the ‘Abbasids
to restore their power and overcome various lords and  ami>r al-umara>’3
–––––––––––––––––
1 Iqt\a>‘, assignment to an individual of  right to collect taxes from an area or
community, usually in exchange for military services; see Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet
and the Age of  the Caliphates: the Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century,
(London and New York: Longman, 1988), p. 399.
2 ‘Ayya>ru>n (sing. ‘ayya>r ), originally a derogatory term meaning “vagabond”,
but later used of  irregular troops and vigilante group; Ibid., p. 398.
3 Ami>r al-umara>’  literally means “commander of  commanders”, title given to
those who took over secular authority in Baghdad after 324/936; Ibid.
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who undermined their authority, crumbled their empire and paved the
way for the coming of  the Buwayhids  and then the Seljuqs. In addition,
it may add to our knowledge of  the political situation of  the ‘Abbasids
and provide us an understanding of  how the weakness of  the ‘Abbasid
caliphate during the Buwayhid and later on during the Seljuqid period
was not only due to incapability of  the caliphs themselves, but also to
the political and economic conditions.
B.  Historical Sources on the ‘Abbasid Economy
The study of  the economic history of  the Arab caliphate is a
recent development. Much of  what has been written falls within the
realm of  fiqh or jurisprudence, and of  cultural and social history. The
available sources were recorded many years after the events on the basis
of  information transmitted by memory. In addition, the majority of
these sources deal with economic problems only tangentially in the form
of  stories and anecdotes.4 Most available texts on economic subjects
deal with the merits of  commerce and merchants, principles, rules and
laws relating to commerce: these include the work of  Muh}ammad al-
Shayba>ni>  (d.804) entitled Kita>b al-Kasb  (Book on Earning) and those of
al-Ja>hiz}: Ih}da> ‘Ashara>t Rasa>’il (Eleven Letters); Risa>la fi> Madh} al-Tujja>r wa
Dhamm Khidmat al-Sult\a>n (In Praise of  Merchants and in Condemnation
of  Officials), al-Tabas\s\ur  bi>’l-Tija>ra (A Clear Look at Trade). In this last
work, al-Ja>hiz} discusses the qualities, values and ways of  evaluating gold,
silver, pearls and precious stones, scent and aromatics, textiles, skins
and other commodities, and lists the goods imported from the provinces
of  the Islamic empire and from foreign countries. Like al-Ja>hiz}, Abu> al-
Fad}l Ja‘far b. ‘Ali>  al-Dimashqi> in his Kita>b al-Isha>ra ila> Mah}a>sin al-Tija>ra
(The Book of  Signs to Know the Benefits of  the Trade) devotes some
space to theoretical and ethical discussions, but his main purpose is to
provide practical guidance for merchants. He discusses the types, qualities
and prices of  merchandise, the importance of  the three types of
merchants (the wholesaler, the exporter and the traveling merchant) and
other necessary information relating to the business of  commerce.
–––––––––––––––––
4 Elias H. Tuma, “Early Arab Economic Policies (1st/7th-4th/10th Century)”,
Islamic Studies, vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1965), p. 1.
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Likewise, ‘Abd al-Sala>m Ha>ru>n, an eleventh century author, discusses
the purchase of  slaves with a classification of  their geographical origins
in his al-Risa>la fi> Shira>’ al-Raqi>q (The Epistle on the Purchase of  Slaves)
while al-Jawabari> (13th century) deals with the subjects of  trickery and
fraud committed by the merchants: al-Mukhta>r  fi>  Kashf   al-Asra>r (The
Selection of  Revealing the Secrets).5
The political and social history of  the Islamic empire has been
thoroughly recorded in works that were written and passed down from
generation to generation, though some of  these works are expanded
and many others are abridged. However, there is a serious scarcity,
especially during the middle period, of  sources dealing exclusively with
the economy, except for some brief  references here and there. There is
practically no work which discusses the particular domain of  economic
dynamism from an experimental point of  view.6
In view of  the above, our discussion of  the economic history of
the ‘Abbasid caliphate before and during the Buwayhid period, will of
necessity be fragmentary. What can be said is based on the only available
written sources, especially Ibn al-Jawzi>’s al-Muntaz}am7 and Miskawayh’s
Taja>rib al-Umam,8 and these relate to the general economic condition of
the caliphate, the factors that led to the decline of  the economy and the
attempts made by some caliphs and sult\a>ns to reverse the economic
decline.
C. General Economic Condition
The economic condition of  the ‘Abbasid empire and the Muslim
world in general in the fourth century was in serious decline. According
to Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Beg, this was manifested in economic
–––––––––––––––––
5 Bernard Lewis, “Sources for the Economic History of  the Middle East”, in
M.A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of  the Middle East from the Rise of  Islam
to the Present Day, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 88-9.
6 H{abib b. Abdallah, Del’iqt\a>‘ Etatique à l’Iqt\a>‘ Militaire: Transition Economique et
Echangement Sociaux à Baghdad, 247-447 de l’Hegira /861-1055 ap. J. (Stockholm: Acta
Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1986), p. 25.
7 Ibn al-Jawzi>,  Abu>  al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Rah}ma>n b. ‘Ali>, Al-Muntaz}am  fi>  Ta>ri>kh
al-Mulu>k wa al-Umam, 10 vols., (Haydarabad: Da>’irat al-Ma‘a>rif  al-‘Uthma>niyya, 1939).
8 Miskawayh, Abu> ‘Ali> Muh}ammad b. Muh}ammad b. Yu>suf, Taja>rib al-Umam,
2 vols, (Tehran: Da>r al-Shuru>sh li’l-T|iba>‘a wa’l-Nashr, 1987).
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depression as well as inflation.9 There are several reports that speak of
the death of  a large number of  people due to starvation caused by
scarcity of  food and rising prices. There are some accounts of  famine
and shortage of  food at different times. We hear of  military revolt
because of  delayed pay, or demands for higher pay, due to price increases,
and of  mass revolt against the government. The revenue of  the
government decreased steadily as agricultural products diminished due
to the fact that most of  the land had been ruined and laid waste by civil
wars and other conflicts. The ami>rs sought ways to replenish the state
treasury, resorting at times to illegitimate methods such as confiscations
and levying fines against corrupt officials and adopted dangerous
measures such as distributing lands to the army and civil servants. The
caliph’s estates were reduced, his palace ransacked, his revenues from
the jawa>li> (poll-tax) diverted and his stipend decreased from year to year.
The decline of  agriculture and the decrease in cultivated areas
started from the very beginning of  Muslim rule, but it accelerated greatly
in the later middle ages. Abu> Yu>suf, who lived during the eighth century
AD, witnessed the agricultural decay of  the Ju>kha> region at the eastern
part of  the Tigris since the Arab conquest. The water resources of  this
once fertile region had disappeared and its agricultural production
diminished.  Abu> Yu>suf  observed as well that the decline of  Iraq’s
agriculture had begun with the conquest by the Muslims. The area which
had been allowed to lay waste since that time was so large that it would
be impossible to bring it under cultivation within a short time.10 The
decrease in cultivated areas also occurred in the western part of  the
empire. The agricultural lands of  Egypt grew increasingly smaller during
the eighth and the first half  of  the ninth centuries. According to al-
Maqri>zi>, in the middle of  the ninth century the country was in decline
with deplorable effects on the revenue of  the government.11
–––––––––––––––––
9 Muh}ammad Abdul Jabbar Beg, “Contribution to the Economic History of
the Caliphate: A Study of  the Cost of  Living and the Economic Status of  Artisans in
Abbasid Iraq”, Islamic Quarterly, 16: 3-4 (July/December, 1972), p. 148.
10 E. Ashtor,  A Social and Economic History of  the Near East in the Middle Ages
(London: Collins, 1976), pp. 58-9.
11 Ibid., p. 60.
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Among the phenomena of  the decline of  the economy at the end
of  the fourth/tenth century was the devaluation of  the dirham, a silver
coin favoured in business transactions. According to Abu> Shuja>‘
Ru>dhrawari>, the reduction in its value was among the factors which led
to the Daylamite revolt in 383/993. Later in 390/999, the Daylamites
criticized the government over the decline of  the dirham, and then
proceeded to the house of  the vizier, Abu> Nas\r, to seize his wealth. The
factor that had caused the decline of  dirham was financial crisis, which
in turn led to the price of  the di>na>r rising to an unprecedented height
during the fourth/tenth century.12
The decline of  agriculture inevitably reduced the revenue of  the
government derived from taxes and agricultural products. Consequently,
the ami>r al-umara>’ or the sult\a>n was forced to reduce the caliph’s estates
and other economic privileges. This encroachment of  the caliph’s
financial resources actually started with the transfer of  the administration
of  the caliphate to the ami>r al-umara>’ Ibn Ra>’fiq in 324/935. The caliph
al-Ra>d}i> bestowed upon him comprehensive power over the army, tax-
gathering and public security in the region under the caliph’s control.13
Although the caliph at this time still had a vizier, he was completely
powerless because he no longer had any control over the provinces and
the di>wa>ns. It was Ibn Ra>’iq’s secretary who controlled the entire business
of  the state. In this respect, Miskawayh says, “The revenue from the
provinces is transmitted to the treasury of  the ami>rs; they order and
prohibit everything regarding it and expend it as they please while
remitting what they choose to the caliph for his expenses. The old
treasuries have ceased to exist.”14
The ami>r al-umara>’ allotted the nafaqa>t (daily allowance) to the caliph,
assigning for this special purpose al-d}iya>‘, called al-d}iya>‘al-mustakhlas\a or
d}iya>‘ al-khidma (estates assigned for the use of  the caliph).15 The d}iya>‘ of
–––––––––––––––––
12 ‘Abd al-‘Azi>z al-Du>ri>, Ta>rikh  al-‘Ira>q al-Iqtis\a>di>  fi> al-Qarn al-Ra>bi>‘  al-Hijri>
(Baghdad: Mat\ba‘at al-Ma‘a>rif, n.d. ), p. 226.
13 Mafizuullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of  Baghdad (334/946-447/1055),
(Calcutta: Iran  Society, 1964), p. 189.
14 Ibid., p. 190; Miskawayh, Taja>rib, vol. 1, P. 352.
15 Muh}ammad b. Yah}ya> al-S|u>li>, Kita>b al-Awra>q, (Al-Qa>hira: Mat\ba‘at  al-Sa>wi>,
1935), pp. 131, 145.
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the sult\a>n or estates of  the caliph originally consisted of  lands which
the ‘Abbasids had confiscated from the Umayyads.16 These increased
gradually through purchase, through confiscation of  the lands of  officials
who had died or those who had been dismissed from their offices for
different reasons or through ilja>’ (postponement). The d}iya>‘ of  the sult\a>n
extended to different parts of  the province of   Iraq, in the Sawa>d, in the
areas adjacent to Baghdad, Ku>fa, Bas\ra and Wa>sit\, and in the lands
reclaimed (murtaja‘a) from the marshes, around Maws\il and in Ahwa>z
and Iran.
Soon after the Buwayhids entered Baghdad in 334/945, they
deprived the caliph al-Mustakfi> of  his control of  the provinces and
gave him a stipend of  two thousand dirhams a day for his personal
expenses (or 60.000 dirhams monthly = 4.600 di>na>rs monthly ).17 As these
payments tended to be delayed, Mu‘izz al-Dawla granted some fiefs,
which were known as d}iya>‘ al-khidma, to the caliph, yielding him a revenue
of  two hundred thousand di>na>rs annually. These were supervised by the
caliph’s personal secretary. In the same year, Mu’izz al-Dawla deposed
al-Mustakfi> and installed al-Mut\i>‘ in his place, annulling the salary and
assigning the caliph an iqt\a>‘ with an annual income of  200.000 di>na>rs.
Two years later, he stopped the daily allowance of  the caliph altogether,
leaving him to rely entirely on the d}iya>‘ al-khidma. Therefore, the income
of  the caliph declined after 334/945 to about seven percent of  what it
had been during the reign of  al-Muqtadir.18 Subsequently, even these
estates also dwindled as a result of  interference from the dependents of
Mu‘izz al-Dawla and Bakhtiya>r, some of  whom seized the outlying estates
of the caliph, while others obtained some of them as iqt\a>‘, and still
others undertook to tax-farm them for revenues, which they had no
intention of  paying.19 In addition, the caliph’s property was frequently
confiscated, his house robbed and precious objects taken. These
confiscations took place three times under Buwayhid rule, but similar
things had also happened before. Al-Ra>d}i> was subjected to confiscation
and forced to pay the ami>r al-umara>’ an amount of  money which he was
–––––––––––––––––
16 Al-Jahshiya>ri>, Kita>b al-Wuzara>’  wa  al-Kutta>b,  (al-Qa>hira, 1938), P. 90.
17 Ibid., p. 250.
18 Ibid., p. 235.
19 Ibid., p. 191; Miskawayh, Taja>rib, vol 2, p. 344.
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unable to raise, leaving him no other choice but to have silver and gold
dishes melted down and struck as coins. Similarly, the caliph al-Muttaqi>
was deprived of  his property and even blinded.20
Ibn al-Jawzi> states that the income from the estates of  the caliph
eventually decreased over the course of  time to only fifty thousand di>na>rs
annually. During the reign of  Sult\a>n al-Dawla, the caliph, al-Qa>dir, was
paid almost the same amount annually, besides two hundred manns
[kilograms] of  aloe woods, fifty manns [kilograms] of  camphor, five
hundred items of luxurious clothing and an unspecified quantity of
scent. Jala>l al-Dawla agreed to continue this for the next caliph al-Qa>’im.21
In addition to the fiefs and stipend, the caliph seems to have been
allotted the proceeds from the jizya or jawa>li>, the poll-tax paid by non-
Muslim subjects. In fact during the emirate of  Jala>l al-Dawla, the soldiers
who were not satisfied with the salary they received collected the jawa>li>,
which was the caliph’s prerogative, interfered with the mint and then
imposed duties for their own benefit on commodities imported into the
capital from Maws\il.22 When Jala>l al-Dawla once again secured the
proceeds of  the jawa>li> in 434, he was obliged in the following year again
to allow their appropriation by the caliph’s officers.23
Because of  the economic crisis, the caliphs during the Buwayhid
period were economically weak. They were not expected to be able to
build a strong army to oppose that of  the sult\a>n, or to draw bureaucrats
to their circle. On the contrary, they lived in simplicity and were constantly
short of  revenue. A clear indication of  the caliph’s lack of  money was
al-Mut\i>‘’s objection against providing money for the holy war against
the Byzantines, which had been demanded by Bakhtiya>r as mentioned
earlier. The economic crisis during the fourth/tenth century not only
caused the caliph’s political weakness, but also incited brigandage, theft,
social conflict and uprising, as we will see later.
–––––––––––––––––
20 Mahmu>d  H{asan Ah}mad and Ah}mad Ibra>hi>m al-Shari>f, al-‘A<lam al-Isla>mi> fi
al-‘As\r al-‘Abba>si>  (Al-Qa>hira: Da>r al-Fikr, n.d.), p. 524.
21 Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, p. 192.
22 Ibid., p. 103; Ibn al-Jawzi>, al-Muntaz}am, vol. 8, p. 78.
23 Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, p. 192.
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D. Factors Leading to the Economic Decline
M. A. Shaban maintains that the economic problems of the empire
resulted from the cumulative effects of  bad management in all fields, at
all levels and of  all regions. The symptoms were not only the lack of
equal opportunities between the various sectors of  society, but also
between the diverse regions of  the empire. The main concern of  the
central government was to exploit its domains without regard for the
interests of  its subjects. The central lords enjoyed the benefits while the
people from the outer areas made all the sacrifices. The government felt
responsible only for enforcing tax-collection, the revenues of  which
were to support a corrupt bureaucracy and an almost useless army. Even
public services were ignored in many cases. Necessary repairs to irrigation
systems were now charged to the users who had to pay for them over
and above the required taxes.24 For more than a century the caliphate
had neglected investment in irrigation and restoration projects in the
most productive of  its provinces. Consequently, in the course of  the
late ninth and early tenth centuries, the economy of  Iraq was ruined.25
Corrupt practices such as hoarding wealth, which had already
started under the Barmakids, continued to influence all ruling circles
and became a regular practice. Members of  the ‘Abbasid family acquired
more and more estates as their numbers increased rapidly. Many
government officials, who came from families with great land holdings
used their position to increase “their own wealth and that of  their
master.”26
The economic crisis during the fourth/tenth century seems to
have been a general phenomenon resulting from several factors, besides
the others mentioned above. Al-Tawh}i>di>, who lived during this period,
wrote, “The hardship, poverty and depressing conditions suffered by
people encouraged them to be stingy; the merchants were more cautious
[in spending their money] and the people were reluctant to do good
–––––––––––––––––
24 M.A. Shaban, Islamic History: A New Interpretation, vol. 2 A.D.750-1055 (A.H.
32-448) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 89-90.
25 Ira M. Lapidus,  A History of  Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 136.
26 Shaban, Islamic History, p. 90.
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deeds, this was in particular due to the hardship they suffered from.”27
The decline of  the economy of  the ‘Abbasid Empire was not
primarily due to malpractice of  the authorities and government officials,
but to other factors as well. There was the civil war between al-Ma’mu>n
and al-Ami>n, and between al-Musta‘i>n and al-Mu‘tazz, the revolts,
especially those of  the the Zanj and Qarmatians, the activity of  the
‘ayya>ru>n, the flight of  peasants to urban areas, natural calamity and the
spread of  plague. In the next sections we will discuss the contributing
factors to the economic decline of  the ‘Abbasid empire, in particular
those of  civil wars, uprisings, military iqt\a>‘ and the activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n.
1. Civil Wars
The civil war between al-Ami>n and al-Ma’mu>n (196/811-198 /
813) had a profound effect on the economy of  the ‘Abbasid empire.
The conflict arose over the status of  the province of  Khura>sa>n.
According to the succession agreement made in Mecca in 186/802, al-
Ma’mu>n was given authority over Khura>sa>n, while Iraq province was to
be under the control of  al-Ami>n. After the death of  their father Ha>ru>n
al-Rashi> d (170-194/786-809), al-Ami>n was persuaded by an important
group of  abna>’28 led by ‘Ali>  b. ‘I<sa>  and the  h}a>jib  al-Fad}l b. Rabi>‘ to
reestablish Baghdad’s control over the province (Khura>sa>n). For his part,
al-Ma’mu>n, supported by his vizier al-Fad}l b. Sahl and the magnates of
Khura>sa>n, was determined to defend his rights and rejected the demands
of  his brother, and even went so far as to proclaim himself  ima>m. The
breach became final when in S|afar 195/810, al-Ami>n appointed his own
son Mu>sa> as heir apparent, removing al-Ma’mu>n from his place in the
succession. Two months later (Rabi>‘ II 195/January 811), ‘Ali> b.‘I<sa> was
appointed governor of  Khura>sa>n and supplied with an army drawn from
the abna>’ and numbering 40, 000 people. In Baghdad, al-Ami>n recruited
the people of  the city, contemptuously referred to as ‘ayya>ru>n, whom the
Arab sources defined as tramps, prisoners, riff-raff, the unemployed,
–––––––––––––––––
27 H{asan Ah}mad and Ibra>hi>m al-Shari>f,> Al-‘Alam al-Isla>mi, p. 209.
28 Abna>’, literally means “sons”, used  (a) of  the descendants of  the Persian
settlers in Yaman at the time of  Muh}ammad,  and (b) of  the descendants of  the
Khura>sa>ni>s who came west with the ‘Abbasids armies and settled in Baghdad; Kennedy,
Prophet, p. 398.
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shopkeepers, peddlers and the dregs of  society.29 These ‘ayya>ru>n  defended
the city using leaves of  palms as helmets, and mat of  reeds filled with
soil and stones as armour and shields, sticks as spears; strips of  cloth
for flags, and the horns of  cows as trumpets.30 Against ‘Ali>  b. ‘I<sa> ‘s
army, al-Ma’mu>n sent T|a>hir b. al-H{usayn  to Rayy with an army of  only
5000. In Sha‘ba>n 195/May 811, the two armies met outside the city
walls of  Rayy and T|a>hir won a decisive victory, ‘Ali>  b. ‘I<sa>  was killed
and his army fled west in disorder. The defeat of  ‘Ali>  b. ‘I<sa>’s army
paved the way for T|a>hir to proceed to Iraq. He defeated a smaller army
of  abna>’ at H{amada>n and established himself, before winter set in, in
Hulwa>n on the edge of  the Iraqi> plains, only a few days journey from
Baghdad itself. In Baghdad, al-Ami>n tried to raise new armies to
supplement the now weakened abna>’, turning first to leading Arab tribes
like the Shayba>ni>s and to the Qaysi>s of  northern Syria. In both cases,
the abna>’ declined to co-operate with their alleged allies, while the Arabs
were unwilling to fight for al-Ami>n without important political
concessions and rewards. Al-Ami>n was therefore unable to organize a
coalition. In the spring of  916/812, T|a>hir was joined by a large army led
by Harthama b. A‘ya>n and succeeded in capturing the cities of  southern
Iraq without any real difficulty. In Dhu al-H{ijja 196/August 812,
Harthama began to lay siege to Baghdad, which lasted slightly over a
year. At the beginning of  198/September 813, after realizing the
impossibility winning the war, al-Ami>n now attempted to surrender to
his father’s old friend Harthama, who sent a boat across the river to
fetch him. However, T|a>hir, suspicious of  any private deals which excluded
him, overturned the boat, captured the caliph and executed him.31
The year-long siege of  Baghdad was an almost unparallel episode
in the history of  Islamic society, in the sense of  its destructive effect on
the city itself  and its citizens. In addition, the years between the death
of  al-Ami>n in 198/813 and the arrival of  al-Ma’mu>n in Baghdad in
–––––––––––––––––
29 Ibid.; CL Cahen quoted by Ahmad, includes to the people of  the ‘ayya>ru>n  as
the following: the naked ‘awra>t (those dressed in rags), working class people (rubaydiyya),
men of  the market (porters, keepers, etc), street vendor (ba>‘at al-t\ari>q), the  populace
(ra>’a>t), wanderers (a>‘ir) especially gangs (awba>sh), and finally the shrewd (shutta>r).
30 Ibid., p. 78.
31 Kennedy, Prophet, pp. 148-52.
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204/819, saw prolonged and destructive fighting throughout the Near
East, but especially in Baghdad and the surrounding countryside.32 This
civil war had presumably an effect on the supply of  food-stuffs from
one region to another within the domain of  the ‘Abbasid caliphate, which
included Iraq, Syria, Persia, H{ija>z and so on. Based on the numismatic
evidence, the civil war also led to the devaluation of  the  ‘Abbasid  di>na>r,
and consequently to a marked inflationary trend in the cost of  living.33
The second civil war occurred between al-Musta‘i>n and al-Mu‘tazz
as a result of  the rivalry between the Turkish commanders who supported
al-Must‘i>n and those who sided with al-Mu‘tazz. The caliph al-Musta‘i>n
left Sa>marra> for Baghdad following his vizier Wasi>f  and Buga>, the latter’s
younger brother, at the beginning of  251/865, due to insecurity and
under attack from other Turks. The Turks remaining in Sa>marra> realized
that an alliance of  the caliph, Wasi>f, Bugha>, the T|a>hirids and the
sha>kiriyya34 of  Baghdad was a formidable threat to their position and
they decided on war. They chose a new caliph for themselves, al-Mu‘tazz,
and embarked on the siege of  Baghdad.
The second siege of  Baghdad resembled in many respects the
first that had occurred during the reign of  al-Ami>n, with its long and
desperate battles, the involvement of  the ‘ayya>ru>n, and finally the divisions
among the defenders, leading to the fall of  the city. Wasi>f  and Bugha>
were less than eager to fight the army of  Sa>marra>, from which they
themselves had come, and transferred the power to others. Furthermore,
the T|a>hirid leader was disappointed with the rebels, weakening the spirit
of  the resistance. As a result, the miserable al-Musta‘i>n was exiled to
Wa>sit\, where he died soon after, while Mu‘tazz became an undisputed




33 Abdul Jabbar Beg,”Contribution”, p. 148.
34 Sha>kiriyya was intact units under the leadership of  their local chiefs, from
Transoxania, Armenia, and North Africa; Ira M. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, p. 127.
35 Kennedy, Prophet, pp. 173-4.
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2. Uprisings and Interference in Politics by Soldiers
There were many revolts recorded by Muslim historians from
classical up to medieval times, that not only resulted in many deaths, but
also involved acts of  looting, the burning of  houses and the devastation
of  agricultural lands. There were many causes of  revolts, often including
political reasons, reaction against oppression or social division. The huge
gap in living standards between the lower strata of  the masses and the
higher ones, who lived luxuriously, stimulated much social discontent.
The rich could enjoy a wide variety of  delights which were available to
them and they had the means to indulge in their wealth. The poor
expressed their bitterness in uprisings and participation in clandestine
movements against the state, like the Qarmatian movements and that
of  the Zanj. The Arabs and the Bedouins embarked on attacking the
Sawa>d of  Ku>fa and the surrounding lands around Baghdad.36
The rebellions, too numerous to list here, were generally
destructive, but the most significant revolts that had an important impact
on the politics and economy of  the   ‘Abbasid empire were those of  the
Zanj (c. 256-319/869-931)37 and the Qarmatians (c . 277-319/890-931).
Zanj is a term applied to the Negroes brought from East Africa who
were employed to remove the nitrous layers which covered the swamp
to the north of  Bas\ra. They numbered from 50 to 500 workers called
“sweepers” whose jobs it was to take out the nitrous layers and pile
them up in mounds, so that the land might become arable again. Their
strict discipline and the poor conditions in which they lived, developed
in them a group spirit, and their great number, amounting to many
thousands, gave them a consciousness of  their own strength. Their leader
was a certain ‘Ali> b. Muh}ammad, who came from Verzenin (near modern
Teheran) and pretended to be an offspring of  the caliph ‘Ali> - as did
many other leaders of  uprisings -, but according to Arab historians, he
belonged to the tribe of  ‘Abd al-Qays.38
At the beginning of  September 256/869, ‘Ali> began to rouse the
sweepers, promising them that he would lead them to freedom, give
–––––––––––––––––
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37 Ashtor, Economic History, pp. 116-7.
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them property and remain faithful to them to the end. His goal was the
overthrow of  the existing regime, the establishment of  a new social
order, and the restoration of  a pure Islam, with the social justice it implied.
As with many other leaders of  revolt, he pretended to be the Mahdi>
whom all Muslims believe will come at the last day and strive for the
restoration of  the true religion.39
The first attack of  the Zanj on Bas\ra in 256/869 was unsuccessful
because they were defeated by the ‘Abbasid army under the command
of  Ja‘la>n and with the support of  other Zabi>bi> and the Banu> Ha>shim.40
Following this defeat, they built their own capital, al-Mukhta>ra (the Elect
City), situated on the canal Nahr Abi> al-Kha>sib, south east of  Bas\ra. In
the same year, they took several towns in the eastern part of  the empire:
al-Ubulla, ‘Abada>n, Khu>zista>n, al-Ahwa>z, killing many of  their
inhabitants.41  They then cut Baghdad’s supplies from the south,
intercepting the ships on the Tigris. In September 257/870, they took
Bas\ra, burning several villages around it, killing whomever they found
and plundering people’s properties.42 Two years later (259/872), they
occupied Ahwa>z for the second time and devastated the district until
they were repelled by the ‘Abbasid army.43 In 262/875, they easily took
Bati>h}a and Dasta Mays\a>n because of  the absence of  the ‘Abbasid army
to fight the S|affa>rids.44 In 265/878, they took three towns on the Tigris:
Jabbul, al-Nu‘ma>niyya and Jarjaraya.45 Having subjugated all these towns,
they then built another new town al-Mani>‘, and in 266/879, they took
Ra>mhurmuz from the Kurdish rebels. This marked their highest
achievement and the peak of  their power, after they had been revolting
for ten years. Their town, al-Mukhta>ra, had become the capital of  the
Zanji> state, incorporating large parts of  southern Iraq and Khu>zista>n.46
–––––––––––––––––
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40 Abu>  Ja‘far Muh}ammad b. Jari>r al T|abari>, Ta>ri>kh al-T|abari> al-Ma‘ru>f  bi Ta>ri>kh
al-Rusul wa al-Mulu>k, vol.7, (Bayru>t: Mu’assasat  al-A‘la>mi>   li’l-Mat\bu>‘a>t, n.d.), p. 431.
41 Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 471-3; Ibn al-Athi>r,  al-Ka>mil fi> al-Ta>ri>kh, vol. 7, Bayru>t: Da>r
al-Kita>b al-‘Ilmiyya, 1987), vol. 7, pp. 236-7.
42 Ibid., pp. 481-2; Ibn al-Athi>r,  al-Ka>mil, vol. 7, pp. 244-6.
43 Ibid., pp. 504-5; Ibn al-Athi>r,  al-Ka>mil, vol. 7, p. 259.
44 Ibid., p. 521; Ibn al-Athi>r,  al-Ka>mil, vol. 7, p. 292.
45 Ibid., p. 521; Ibn al-Athi>r,  al-Ka>mil, vol. 7, p. 322.
46 Ashtor, Economic History, P. 119.
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In 267/880, Abu> al-‘Abba>s b. al-Muwaffaq, the future caliph al-
Mutad}id, was able to seize the regions along the Tigris from the leader
of  the Zanj, Sulayman b. Ja>mi>‘. In the month of  Rabi>‘, al-A<khir, al-
Muwaffaq and his son Abu>  al-‘Abba>s, succeeded in taking al-Mani>‘a
and al-Mans\u>ra. As part of  the strategy for attacking the Zanj, in this
year, al-Muwaffaq built a city facing the city of  al-Mukhta>ra, named
after him, al-Muwaffaqiyya.47 The next year, al-Muwaffaq’s army began
to destroy the fortresses of  al-Mukhta>ra, and while some of  his army
had penetrated the town for the first time, they were faced by the army
of  the Zanj and some of  them were killed, forcing them to retreat to
their encampment, the city of  al-Muwaffaqiyya. Al-Muwaffaq caught
the merchants who supplied the Zanj in al-Mukhta>ra, killing some of
them and taking others prisoner.48 The raid on al-Mukhta>ra ceased for a
while because al-Muwaffaq was wounded during the combat.49 When
he recovered from his wound, in Sha‘ba>n 269/February 883, al-Muwaffaq
resumed military activity, joined by Lu’lu’ and the T|u>lu>nid army. After
about six months of  bitter fighting, al-Mukhta>ra was taken and ‘Ali> b.
Muh}ammad killed, with his head brought to Baghdad and exhibited to
the people. Some of  his commanders, such as Sulayman b. Ja>mi‘ and
Ibra>hi>m b. Ja‘far al-Hamadha>ni>, were taken prisoners.50 The Zanj’s revolt,
which had terrorized Iraq and undermined the ‘Abbasid empire for
fourteen years, was finally subdued. Kennedy comments on the effect
of  the Zanj’s rebellions as follows:
Slave farming and large-scale reclamation of  land were never begun
again and it seems unlikely that the city of  Bas\ra ever fully recovered.
Trade routes had been disrupted for too long, merchants had found
other ways of  communicating with the east, via Si>ra>f  in southern Iran
for example, and Bas\ra and southern Iraq in general entered a long
period of  decline.51
–––––––––––––––––
47 T|abari>, Ta>ri>kh, vol. 9, p. 585.
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Revolte des Esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe ciecle  (Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner,
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In addition, the revolt of  the Zanj was a decisive phase in the
history of  the caliphal empire. The disruptive forces became so strong
that they brought about its decomposition. North Africa had broken
away a long time ago. During the long war against the revolting slaves,
and in the period that followed, many other countries separated
themselves from the ‘Abbasid caliphate.52 Above all, the revolt of  the
Zanj contributed to the damage of  agriculture of  Sawa>d and its irrigation
systems, paralyzed the trade and commerce of  southern Iraq, and
exposed the weakness of  the political and military system of  the
caliphate.53
This major political calamity was followed by the menacing
Qarmatian revolt. The Qarmatians or Qara>mit\a (sing. Qarmat\i> ) were the
adherents of  a branch of  the Isma>‘i>liyya. Originally the name was given
to the followers of  H{amda>n Qarmat\ (H{amda>n b. al-Ash‘ath), an Isma>‘i>li>
leader in the sawa>d of  Ku>fa. It is said that he came from Khu>zista>n and
then resided in a village called Nahrin, where his piety and asceticism
attracted many people. He made da‘wa  on behalf  of  one of  the ‘Alid
ima>ms and so many people joined him.54 Based on the work of  al-Fad}l b.
Sha>dha>n (d. 260/873-4), al-Radd ‘ala> al-Qara>mit\a, a refutation of  the
Qarmatians, this activity must have started before the year 261/874-5
or 264/877-8, which is mentioned by the sources as the date of  the
beginning of  the movement. At first the movement led by H{amda>n was
“merely part of  the general Isma>‘ili> movement of  his time whose
leadership he recognized.”55 However, after his revolt against the
leadership in 286/899, and his subsequent disappearance, the Qarmatians
threw off  their allegiance to the Fa>t\imid caliph.56 Another Qarmat\i leader,
by the name Abu> Sa‘i>d al-Janna>bi>, appeared in Bah}rayn, attracting many
followers from among the Arabs and other Qarmatians, so that their
movement became strong. They killed the people of  Bah}rayn and then
–––––––––––––––––
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53 Sa‘ad,  al-‘A<mma, p. 181.
54 Tha>bit b. Sina>n and Ibn al-‘Adi>m,  Akhba>r al-Qara>mit\a, tah}qi>q: Suhayl Zakka>r
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went to Qati>f, murdering its inhabitants and intending to march on
Bas\ra.57 In 287/900, Abu> Sa‘i>d and his followers raided H{ajar and some
of  them approached Bas\ra, defeating the ‘Abbasid army under the
leadership of  al-‘Abba>s b. ‘Amr al-Ghunawi>.58 In Dhu> al-Qa‘da, the
‘Abbasids  sent Badr, a ghula>m of  al-T|a>’i‘, to fight Abu> Sa‘i>d and was
successful in killing many of  the latter’s followers.59
The killing and capture of  so many people, along with the
destruction of  the country by the Qarmatian,  led the people of  Syria
and Egypt to send complaints to the caliph al-Muktafi. At the end of
Ramadan in 291/904, the latter then sent an army to Syria under the
command of  Muhammad b. Sulayman, who defeated the Qarmatian  in
the west of  Hamah, taking many of  them prisoners, and the rest escaping
to the desert.60 Two years later (293/906), the Qarmatian, under the
leadership of  Zikrawayh, defeated the ‘Abbasid army and attacked the
caravans of  Khura>sa>ni>  pilgrims on their return from Mecca, at ‘Aqaba,
killing about 20.000 pilgrims,61 and seizing  goods worth about one
million di>na>rs. The next year (294/907), the ‘Abbasid army, under the
command of  Wa>s\if b. Suwartakin, met Zikrawayh on the way to Khaffa>n
or Khiffa>n on 18 Rabi‘ al-Awwal, and a fierce battle broke out, during
which Zikrawayh was captured and died a few days later.62
The first militant stage of  the Qarmatian movement seems to
have ceased temporarily when Abu> Sa‘i>d al-Janna>bi> was assassinated in
his new capital at Has\a> near Hajar in 301/914. His successor, Abu> T|a>hir,
accepted a reconciliation offered by the caliph al-Muqtadir and a peaceful
situation lasted for about ten years.63 However, from 311/923 to 316/
928, Abu> T|a>hir launched a series of  devastating campaigns into southern
–––––––––––––––––
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Iraq, raiding Bas\ra and Ku>fa repeatedly, attempting unsuccessful attacks
on Baghdad, and attacking the pilgrims’ caravan.64 The most barbarous
acts committed by the Qarmatians occurred in 317/930, when they
raided Mecca, slaughtering the pilgrims and inhabitants, and carrying
off  to Bahrayn, the Black Stone of  the Ka‘ba, which was not returned
until 339/951.65 In 357/968, the Qarmat\i> al-H{asan al-A‘s\am took
Damascus and ravaged Ramla after defeating the Ikhshi>dids.66 The next
year, the Ikhshi>dids agreed to pay tribute for Ramla and Damascus after
they had been defeated by the Qarmatians.67 Their attacks on Egypt and
Syria continued until they were defeated by the Fa>t\imid caliph, al-‘Azi>z,
in 368/978, and retreated to H{asa> in exchange for a sizable annual tribute
paid to them.68
The Qarmatians’ rebellion, according to Kennedy, “was to weaken
the settled communities at the expense of  the bedouin, a process which
was to continue throughout the next century and a half.”69 They also
damaged the trade of  the Persian Gulf  and the trade between Arabia
and Iraq, causing the latter to suffer from a decline in international trade.
The disruption of  the caliphate interfered with the international routes
which brought goods from the Far East and South Asia to Baghdad for
trans-shipment to the Mediterranean. In the late tenth century, the
Fa>t\imid regime helped to promote an alternative international route
through the Red Sea and Cairo, which also damaged the commercial
prosperity of  Iraq.70 Incessant warfare severely ruined irrigation works
in the Tigris region and large districts became depopulated.71
In the midst of  these severe threats, further confusion ensued
due to misadministration and the interference of  Turkish soldiers in
–––––––––––––––––
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politics during the first half  of  the tenth century A.D.72 The transfer of
power into the hands of  the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers, led to a
general decline in the economic condition of  Iraq. The currency and
banking system suffered from stagnation and financial activity decreased
during this period.73
In addition, the rule of  the ami>r al-umara>’ had unfortunate
consequences for the irrigation system which could not be improved
due to the limited efforts of  the state.74 During the rule of  the ami>r al-
umara>’ between 324-335/935-945, the canals were neglected and the
country ruined due to the rivalries and wars between the ami>rs, and the
confusion brought on by the mutiny of  the army. During the conflict
between the Turkish ami>r Bakjam and Ibn Ra>’iq, the latter destroyed the
river Diyali and committed many evil acts which caused damage to the
dams of  Nahrawa>n, consequently ruining agriculture. In 329/940, the
dams of  the rivers Rafi>l and Bu>q were damaged and were not repaired,
rendering the Badu>riya river useless for about ten years. In 330/941, the
Nahrawa>n river dam was damaged due to the depredation of  Ibn Ra>‘iq
and his soldiers. In the year 333/934, the ‘I<sa> river dam was damaged
and the ami>r al-umara>’ failed to repair it. And finally, the Kha>lis river dam
was damaged in the same year and no restoration was attempted except
that the caliph closed the damaged dam on the S|ara>t river in 327/938.
Al-S|u>li>  describes the consequence of  this deed, saying that,” it destroyed
the world, and increased prices to a dangerous level up to this time”, i.e.
to the year 334/945. This black period was brought to a close by the
invasion of  the Buwayhids of  Baghdad in 334/945. The Buwayhid
occupation of  Baghdad for a century (945-1055), was characterized by
civic disturbances between Sunnites and Sh‘ites, the lawless activities of
the ‘ayya>ru>n and other upheavals affecting public security, and the general
debasement of  the di>na>r leading to inflation.75
In addition,  rivalry between the leaders, during the period of  ami>r
al-umara>’, trying to impose their power on Baghdad and the consequences
of  their domination on agricultural income and the destruction of
–––––––––––––––––
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farmlands and the irrigation systems, all delivered a fatal blow to
agriculture. This inevitably caused famine and diseases, which killed a
great number of  people in Baghdad and encouraged others to flee from
the city.76
3. Military Iqt\a>‘
Another factor which brought about economic decline was the
introduction of  the military iqt\a>‘, namely an iqt\a>‘ granted to soldiers in
lieu of  salary. In the fourth/tenth century the iqt\a>‘ passed into military
phase in which the lands were distributed to the soldiers on a large
scale. This was a result of  several factors, among them the emptiness of
the state treasury during the last years of  the reign of  al-Muqtadir (after
317/929) and under his successors, the lack of  experience on the part
of  the first Buwayhids in administration, and military anarchy.77 The
granting of   iqt\a>‘  and the creation of  tax-farms caused the peasants to
lose their motivation to maintain rural productivity.78
The year 334/945 was decisive in the development of  this practice,
since Mu‘izz al-Dawla started to distribute iqt\a>‘s to his soldiers without
calculation, a policy which was followed by the Buwayhids who succeeded
him. From that time onwards, the military iqt\a>‘ increased steadily to the
extent that the iqt\a>‘ mudniyya79 became second in importance. The military
iqt\a>‘ expanded at the expense of  other kinds of  lands, such as the special
iqt\a>‘, estates of  the caliph and the lands belonging to the state treasury.
‘Ad}ud al-Dawla went so far as to bestow his army the waqf   land (land
belonging to a religious endowment).80
Actually, the military iqt\a>‘ was not hereditary, neither was it for a
lifetime. It was not considered a possession of  the muqt\i>‘  (the holder of
–––––––––––––––––
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iqt\a>‘ ), because the Buwayhid ami>r reserved the right to cancel it whenever
he wished. If  it was given to military leaders, its revenue was a
compensation for the salary which the Buwayhid treasury could no longer
pay its soldiers. The grant of   iqt\a>‘  was accompanied by an agreement
which implied that the holders of  the  iqt\a>‘ were obliged to send a certain
amount of  money or its equivalent from the produce of  the land, all at
one time or by installments. They were also responsible for the
maintenance of  the canals crossing their lands.81 In reality, however,
they did not pay anything to the state treasury. They exploited their land
as they wished and entrusted the working of  their iqt\a>‘ to their deputies,
while not declaring their revenues, a tradition which was carried on from
the time of  Mu‘izz  al-Dawla up to the time of   ‘Ad}ud al-Dawla.82
Miskawayh provides us a detailed description about Mu‘izz al-
Dawla’s dealing with the land. He mentions that in 334/945, the army
mutinied against him and demanded its pay. Realizing that the treasury
was empty, Mu‘izz al-Dawla granted his Daylamite followers and leading
officers, his courtiers and his Turkish soldiers, estates belonging to the
sult\a>n, people who had gone into hiding, and Ibn Shirza>d, a former
vizier, as well, and dues belonging to the public treasury on estates in
private ownership. The result was that the Sawa>d ceased to pay taxes
and no longer was under the control of  revenue officers; only a small
part of  it remained liable to taxation and was therefore farmed.83
Mu‘izz al-Dawla’s measure in granting most of  the state lands to
his soldiers, according to Miskawayh, was a grave mistake. He also granted
most of  the lands of  al-Sawa>d in fiefs while they were still in a desolate
and unproductive state and before they were restored to cultivation.
Added to this, the viziers did not take harsh measures against the frivolous
holders of  the iqt\a>‘s, letting themselves be bribed and be persuaded by
intermediaries so that the iqt\a>‘s were obtained on an inconsistent ‘ibra
(measurement of  the land liable to taxation).84 Those who gained profits,
–––––––––––––––––
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retained their grants, while those who did not, returned their iqt\a>‘s and
received others so as to compensate them for their losses. The mischief
was so wide-spread that it became regular practice for the soldiers to
ruin their iqt\a>‘s and then return them in exchange for land they were
allowed to choose for themselves, thereby benefiting enormously.85
The grantees often entrusted the management of  their estates to
slaves and agents, who kept no account of  profits and losses and did
nothing to further productiveness or improvement. They merely
embezzled their masters’ property by various methods, while their
masters recouped themselves for the loss of  revenues by fines and unjust
dealings. The officers in charge of  the irrigation system departed because
the territory was no longer in the hands of  the sult\a>n. Their duties had
been reduced to calculating what was needed for irrigation, which was
then apportioned to the assignees, who neglected to pay for their shares,
and if  they paid, the money was embezzled and not spent on the purposes
for which it was levied. These inspectors were indifferent to possible
accidents, being content to take what could benefit them and disregarding
sources of  danger. They would make new demands of  the government
or return the grants which had gone to ruin in their possession, and
handed over the administration of  each district to the leading Daylamites,
who regarded them as their private domain for life. These governors
were surrounded by dishonest agents whose aim was to delay matters,
to make adjustment and to put off  payments or taxes from year to year.86
After mentioning the corrupt practices of  the holders of  iqt\a>‘s,
Miskawayh mentions the consequences which led to the damage of  the
cultivated lands in particular and the decline of  the economy in general.
Over the course of  time, he maintains, principles relating to the land
were abandoned, canals were ruined, and government agencies were
annulled, so that misfortunes fell on the cultivators. They either left
their villages or endured injustice without obtaining redress or
surrendered lands to the muqt\a>‘ in order to escape oppression by coming
to terms with him. Consequently, cultivation ceased, some of  the di>wa>ns
were closed, and the very tradition of  clerkship and administration
–––––––––––––––––
85 Miskawayh, Taja>rib, vol. 2, pp. 96-100; Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 2, p. 100.
86 Ibid.
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vanished.87
The districts not included in such iqt\a>‘ were assigned to two classes
of  men, one being comprised of  generals and other officers of  the
army, while the other was made up of  government officials and men of
business. The officers were eager to hoard wealth, gain profits, raise
grievances, and demand reductions in taxes. If  they were investigated,
they became enemies of  the sultans. If  their wealth was reduced by
payments that were strictly demanded from them, they became open
rebels. If  they were treated with leniency, their greed became worse and
stopped at nothing. The civilians of  the official class, on the other hand,
were more skillful than the military at transferring liability onto the
shoulders of  the government and at making stealthy profits at its
expense.88
Miskawayh goes further, saying that Mu‘izz al-Dawla continued
to follow his inclination as regards his soldiers, freely distributing grants
of  land (iqt\a>‘) and increasing stipends, sometimes showering them with
riches and favours. He was, therefore, unable to save money for accidents
or to preserve revenue. His expenses increased whereas his resources
diminished till there was a deficit against him, which was never kept
under control, but tended to increase at an enormous rate. In the course
of  time, this led to the Daylamites’ demands not being met, and to their
becoming envious of  the Turks by reason of  their favoured position.
Necessity compelled the sult\a>n to attach the Turks more closely to
himself, and promote them higher and higher, favouring them more
and more and relying on them against the Daylamites. As his favour was
increasingly bestowed on the former and neglect shown to the latter,
enmity occurred, and indeed with the Turks being stimulated by greed
and the Daylamites by want and poverty, the instinct of  revolt was
engendered, becoming the cause of  what happened later.89
Mu‘izz al-Dawla had planted the roots of  destruction in the
economic and political spheres. Economically, he damaged cultivated
–––––––––––––––––
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88 Ibid.
89 Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 5, pp. 100-5; Miskawayh, Taja>rib, vol. 2, pp. 97-102;
H.F. Amedroz, “Abbasid Administration”, pp. 823-4.
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lands, which constituted the main source of  revenues for the state.
Therefore, it was no wonder that he always lacked money to pay his
army, or that the latter often rebelled against him. Politically, he laid the
ground for conflicts and division within his army, leading to his
destruction by the policy of  favouring one group, i.e. the Turks, and
neglecting the other, i.e. the Daylamites.
4. The Activity of  the ‘Ayya>ru>n
The economic problems of  Iraq, and particularly those of
Baghdad, were aggravated by the activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n (sing. ‘ayya>r).
Historical accounts mention that scarcity of food stuffs or increase in
prices resulted from the activities of  the ‘ayya>ru>n, who frequently
plundered and raided merchants’ stores, disturbing the flow of
merchandise, costing them money and inevitably led to increases in prices.
Furthermore, the ‘ayya>ru>n very often burnt shops, and the Turkish army,
when in search of  the ‘ayya>ru>n or during clashes with them, also set fire
to the shops in which they had hidden themselves.
From the fourth/tenth century onwards, the movement of  the
‘ayya>ru>n was a common element in the public life of  Baghdad. The first
appearance of  the ‘ayya>ru>n  mentioned by T|abari>  and Mas‘u>di> was during
the cruel siege of  Baghdad by T|a>hir, the commander of  al-Ma’mu>n’s
army. According to T|abari>, al-Ami>n looked at the people who had no
armour or weapons, and ordered the house of  armaments to be opened
for them and the prisoners broke out of  prison and joined al-Ami>n’s
forces to defend the capital.90 They were organized according to units
of  ten men, commanded by an ‘a>rif, one hundred men by a na>qib,  one
thousand men by a qa>‘id and ten thousand of  men by an ami>r.91 Their
chiefs were known as Dunal, Damhal, Abu> Numla, Abu> Asara,
Daykuwayh (Halawayh), Yantawayh (Ninawayh), names which indicate
that men of  all races and faiths mixed together.92 These ‘ayya>ru>n, using
sticks and stones, fought to repel T|a>hir’s soldiers, who wore armour
–––––––––––––––––
90 T|abari>, Ta>ri>kh, vol., 8, pp. 429-30, 443.
91 Mas‘u>di>, Muru>j  al-Dhahab wa Ma‘a>din al-Jawhar, vol. 2 (Bayru>t: Mu’assasa al-
‘A<lam li’l-Mat\bu>‘a>t, 1991), p.  318.
92 C. Cahen, Mouvements  Populaires et Autonomisme Urbain dans l’Asie Musulmane
du Moyen Age (Leiden: E.J. Brill,  1959), p. 37.
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and carried spears. They fought as though possessed and great numbers
of  them were killed.93 When the fight became prolonged and extended
to different places along the eastern river, the ‘ayya>ru>n came from
everywhere and assembled, numbering “about one hundred thousand
men” and attacked the army of  al-Ma’mu>n. Many of  them were killed,
wounded or drowned.94 It is likely that the chief  of  the ‘ayya>ru>n was
among those who advised al-Ami>n not to surrender after his defeat, but
to flee to Syria, from where he could continue the fight. During this
period, a number of  poems were written on the heroic fight of  the
‘ayya>ru>n in defense of  the city of  Baghdad.95 In the course of  time, they
sometimes mixed in the society, sometimes marched in the streets or in
demonstrations. There are plenty of  accounts of  their uprisings at the
end of  the 10th century, in the third decade of  the 11th century, and the
fourth decade of  the 12th century.96
When the caliph, al-Muhtadi>, was head of  the army and lacked
support against the Turkish officers whose soldiers mutinied in 256/
869, he decided to retreat and made an appeal to anyone who would aid
him to continue the battle. Only the‘ayya>ru>n  answered his appeal. Arriving
at the front gates of  the prison, they took the bridle of  the caliph’s
horse and asked him to liberate the prisoners, not letting him go until he
had given orders to this effect.97
In 325/936 the governor of  Baghdad, Lu’lu’, incorporated into
the ranks of  the police the ‘ayya>ru>n and the men of  faction (ahl al-
‘as\abiyya).98 And when ami>r al-Bari>di> marched towards Baghdad in 330/
941, and ami>r Ibn Ra>’iq and the caliph went out to face him, a considerable
number of  the ‘ayya>ru>n from “all quarters of  the city” assembled to
participate in the war. On Friday, al-Bari>di> was defamed in the pulpits
of  the city’s mosques.99
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95 Ibid.
96 Simha Sabari, Mouvements populaires à Baghdad  à l’Epoque Abbasside, ixe-xe
siecles ( Libraire d’Amerique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, n.d.), p. 77.
97 Ibid., p. 79.
98 Cahen, Mouvements  Populaires, p. 37.
99 Ibid.
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In addition to patriotism demonstrated by the ‘ayya>ru>n, they were
very frequently  involved in brigandage, plunder and riot. The period of
trouble which marked the first part of  4th/5th centuries, was naturally
conducive to the appearance of  the ‘ayya>ru>n. Indeed, starting in 306/
918, they began to appear as groups of  thieves, sometimes as assistants
of  political leaders facing the weakness of  the regular public force. In
the course of  time, the ‘ayya>ru>n quite often fought against the authorities,
especially the chief  of  the police and the preacher of  the mosque. For
example, in 307/919, Nujh was appointed as head of  the police in
Baghdad. He installed several faqi>hs (experts on Islamic law) in their
headquarters so that the police might act according to their rulings and
advice. The ‘ayya>ru>n, without due respect to Nujh, continued to launch
attacks against the merchants of  the city.100
The ‘ayya>ru>n activities seem to have been frequently similar to those
of  thieves. The poverty and hardship suffered by the poor resulted in
different manifestations, such as theft, hard work, public disturbance,
asceticism and Sufism, and adherence to Shi>‘ism.101 The activities of  the
thieves formed a significant phenomenon. The thieves came from the
poor or oppressed class of  society and increased in number as changes
took place in the Iraqi> community, such as the emergence of  large and
crowded cities, the increase of  consumption, the rise in the cost of
living, the declining conditions of  farmers and the increasing pressures
caused by the bedouin migration to the cities in the fourth century. This
development left behind a social group, unable to feed itself  or earn a
livelihood, that sought vengeance and revolted against the authorities
who had failed to improve living conditions.102
Abu> H{ayya>n al-Tawh}i>di> tells us of  the consequences of  this
political and social instability, which encouraged the activities of  the
thieves (‘ayya>ru>n ).103 In 332/943, Ibn H{amdi>, the reputed ‘ayya>r, began
to cause trouble for the authorities. According to al-S|u>li>, he had been a
porter in an iron shop before becoming a thief. The ami>r Shirza>d
–––––––––––––––––
100Miskawayh, Taja>rib, vol. 1, p. 69; see also Sabari, Mouvements Populaires, p. 79.
101Sa‘ad, al-‘A<mma, p. 211.
102Ibid.
103Ibid., p. 213.
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employed him to guard the route to Wa>sit\ on the condition that he
return all the money amounting to fifteen thousand di>na>rs from his
plunder of  the ships. Accordingly, Ibn H{amdi> and his men increased
their activity of  plundering the rich people of  Baghdad, day and night.
The governor of  Baghdad, Ashkorj  (Abu> al-‘Abba>s al-Daylami> ),
employed Ibn H{amdi> to find the thieves, but the latter instead became
the head of  the bandits against the landlords. The ami>r T|u>zu>n gave an
order for his arrest, and when he was finally caught, he was tortured and
a group of  his men also seized and crucified.104
In the face of  popular pressure, in 361/971, a mobilization against
the Byzantine was proclaimed. There was a massive mobilization, in the
course of  which the ‘ayya>ru>n made their appearance. A fight broke out
between the crowd, who possessed weapons, and the ‘as\abiyya. The people
were divided into fitya>n (youth), Sunnites and Shi>‘ites and the ‘ayya>ru>n.
The latter, taking advantage of  the confusion, plundered people’s
properties and burnt houses and shops, especially in the al-Karkh
quarter.105 One year later (362/972), the quarter of  al-Karkh was burnt
again on the order of  the vizier,  Abu>  al-Fad}l, as revenge for the murder
of  police in al-Karkh. Many shops were burnt (17.000 shops, 320 houses)
whose revenues amounted to 43.000 di>na>rs monthly.106 In addition, the
‘ayya>ru>n attacked the merchants, plundered their money, their goods and
broke into their houses. The merchants were forced to mount guards.107
The activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n resumed in 364/974, when they set fire to
the shops of  wood, butchery, mats and straw. Their power increased to
the point that they rode on mounted horses and claimed that they were
commanders (quwwa>d). They took it upon themselves to guard the
markets and the street.108
The trouble made throughout Baghdad by the ‘ayya>ru>n increased
in 380/990 when a fight broke out, first among themselves, and then
spread, eventually including the inhabitants of  al-Karkh and Ba>b al-
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105Ibn al-Athi>r, al-Ka>mil, vol. 8, p. 619.
106Ibn al-Jawzi>, al-Muntaz}am, vol. 7, p. 60.
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Bas\ra, Shi>‘ite and Sunnite communities. Each of  them had a leader and
each place of  commerce had its guards. Properties were plundered, and
crime and violence prevailed. Each group burnt the other’s shops. The
evil deeds of  the ‘ayya>ru>n resumed in 384/994, resulting in a struggle
between the people of  al-Karkh and Ba>b al-Bas\ra. The ‘ayya>ru>n joined
their leader, a man by the name of  al-‘Azi>z, who appeared from Ba>b al-
Bas\ra, where his influence was great and where he had wreaked a great
deal of  terror. He and his followers burnt shops, fought the police, took
product-taxes (d}ara>’ib al-amti‘a ) from the merchants of  al-Karkh, collected
irtifa>‘ al-aswa>q  (dues taken from the markets) from other tradesmen,
before escaping in a boat.109
During the conflict between the masses and the Christians, the
former plundered the Qat\i>‘a section in 392/1001 and were joined by
the ‘ayya>ru>n, among them the ‘Abbasids and the ‘Alids, who were involved
in the riot, causing much trouble and destruction in Baghdad. They
committed evil deeds and plundered the property of  many individuals,
killing some of  them and driving many to the edge of  destruction. Baha>’
al-Dawla then sent ‘Ami>d al-Juyu>sh Abu> ‘Ali> b. Usta>dh Hurmu>z to Iraq
to restore order. Once he entered Baghdad on Thursday 17 Dhulh{ijja,
he punished equally the ‘Abbasid and the ‘Alid ‘ayya>ru>n, as well as many
Turks, by drowning them in the river. He also banned the Shi>‘ites and
Sunnites from celebrating their sacred days.110
In 416/1025, the ‘ayya>ru>n increased their activity by breaking into
the houses of  people during the day and during the night, carrying torches
while marching in procession. They entered into people’s homes and
demanded their possessions, while often killing people openly and
burning al-Karkh. They targeted the Turks as well. The police measures,
as well as the bolting and strengthening of  doors and gates, were of  no
avail. The Turks burnt T|a>q al- H{ara>ni> in the course of  the riot between
them and the ‘ayya>ru>n and the masses. This state of  confusion caused
prices to rise, so that one kurr of  wheat cost 80  di>na>rs, and many people
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left their countries.111
In 420/1029, many raids and evil deeds were committed by the
‘ayya>ru>n in the east section of  the capital city of  Baghdad under the
leadership of  al-Burju>mi>. Many bandits joined him and stayed with him.112
They entered stores which they had already marked before. In the absence
of  the police, they acted freely and entered the house of   Abu>  Bakr b.
Tamma>m, the preacher, next to Qahrama>na mosque, facing towards
Da>r al-Mamlaka (Palace of  the Caliph). From the eastern section they
continued their attacks to the western section, and many houses were
plundered and stores broken into, the mosque of  al-Rus\a>fa was attacked
during the night and the clothes of  those who were in it were stolen.
The caliph, al-Qa>dir, therefore, gave permission to transfer all the
belongings of  the mosque such as curtains, lamps, etc. to the residence
of the caliph.113
On 20 Dhuh{ijja of  the same year, Abu> Ya‘la> al-Maws\ili> and his
followers from ‘Awa>na and ‘Ukba>ra, came to Baghdad. They killed five
policemen and entered al-Karkh waving their swords, claiming that
Kama>l al-Di>n  Abu>  Sina>n had sent them to protect the city and to serve
the sult\a>n. The people of  al-Karkh opposed them, killing and crucifying
those who were caught.114 In 421/1030, at night, al-Burju>mi> and his
followers would attack the stores and kha>ns in the streets of  ‘Aliyya and
Rabi>‘ and seize many goods.115 They plundered the garment shops,
making off  with a great many goods. The people of  al-Karkh rose against
the ‘ayya>ru>n  and chased them away, while merchants closed their stores
and slept in them. They demanded that the authorities send in the police
to help them restore order in the city. Abu> Ah}mad al-Nasawi>, the chief
of  police, tried to crush the ‘ayya>ru>n and succeeded in causing them to
subside temporarily. However, when they began to gain the upper hand,
the riots resumed and al-Nasawi> was forced to flee for his life.116
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On Saturday night, 22 Rabi>‘ al-A<khir of  the same year (421/1030),
a group of  bandits came to the Bara>tha> mosque and stole whatever they
could, going so far as to pull out its iron windows. Rioting began and
lasted for days, with savage crimes being committed, especially in the al-
Karkh quarter. The sult\a>n was powerless to stop the riot and,
consequently, lost much of  his dignity and authority.117 The frequent
raids on the al-Karkh quarter has two possible explanations. First, the
al-Karkh section was the centre for merchants, where many shops were
found. Second, those ‘ayya>ru>n who often raided al-Karkh, were of  the
Abbasid ‘ayya>ru>n, who raided it in an attempt to damage the headquarters
of  the Shi>‘ites.
From the above, we learn that the ‘ayya>ru>n had committed many
evil deeds, such as looting, burning and killing many people in Baghdad,
causing invaluable material losses for merchants, in particular, and the
masses, in general. Many people were also killed during their raids and
riots. Frequent riots incited by the ‘ayya>ru>n brought about insecurity and
recurrence of  disturbances in the centre of  the caliphate. This, in turn,
discouraged economic growth in the capital city because many merchants,
who feared the raids launched by the ‘ayya>ru>n, would not do business in
Baghdad, but rather traded in other cities, which were secure from the
activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n. In addition, the riots incited by the ‘ayya>ru>n very
often involved clashes between the Shi>‘ites, who lived mostly in the al-
Karkh section, and the Sunnites, who resided in the Ba>b al-Bas\ra.
Furthermore, since among the ‘ayya>ru>n were ‘Abbasids and ‘Alids, their
crimes were also linked to the enmity between both communities. The
authorities seem to have been powerless to crush the ‘ayya>ru>n. It was not
until 392/1001, when the iron handed ‘Ami>d al-Juyu>sh, Baha>’ al-Dawla’s
deputy in Baghdad, was able to execute and overcome the ‘ayya>ru>n. During
his tenure, up to his death in 402/1011, the city was relatively peaceful
because of  his harsh measures against the ‘ayya>ru>n and inciters of
communal clashes. After his death, the ‘ayya>ru>n resumed their activity
and did so by provoking people among the Shi>‘ites and Sunnites.
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E. Concluding Remark
The economic condition of  the ‘Abbasid caliphate in the fourth/
tenth century suffered from sharp decline. This is due to several factors:
civil wars, uprising of  the Zanj (Negroes) and Qarmatians, interference
of  soldiers in politics, military iqt\a>‘ and activities of  the ‘ayya>ru>n. The
civil wars had a destructive effect on the city of  Baghdad and disturbed
the supply of food stuffs from one region to another within the domain
of  the ‘Abbasid caliphate. They ruined most lands, caused a decrease in
government revenues, and loss of  agricultural products, leading to a
devaluation of  the ‘Abbasid dirham and di>na>rs .
The uprising of  the Zanj which lasted for about 14 years,
contributed to the damage of  agriculture of  Sawa>d (rural area of  Iraq)
and its irrigation system paralyzed the trade of  southern Iraq, and
weakened the political and military power of  the caliphate. The uprising
of  the Zanj was followed by that of  the Qarmatians. The latter not only
massacred a great number of  people but also damaged the trade of  the
Persian Gulf  and the trade between Arabia and Iraq, causing the latter
to suffer a decline in international trade. The disruption of  the caliphate
interfered with the international route that brought goods from the Far-
East and South Asia to Baghdad for transhipment to the Mediterranean
Sea. This situation was aggravated by the takeover of  the ‘Abbasid power
by the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers. Consequently, the currency and
banking system stagnated and financial activity decreased. Due to rivalries
and wars, the canals were neglected, the country was damaged, and some
rivers and dams were ruined.
The decline of  the ‘Abbasid dynasty also resulted from the military
iqt\a>‘. It caused damage to the cultivated lands, in particular, and the
decline of  economy, in general. The principles related to good dealings
with the land were abandoned. As a result, canals were ruined due to
the lack of  maintenance, cultivation ceased and government agencies,
whose task was to look after the lands, were annulled.
Finally, the economy of  the ‘Abbasid caliphate declined through
the activity of  the ‘ayya>ru>n. They committed many evil deeds, such as
looting merchants’ goods, burning houses and killing the people of
Baghdad, causing invaluable material losses on the part of   the merchants.
Frequent riots, incited by the ‘ayya>ru>n,  brought about disturbances in
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the centre of  the caliphate, and discouraged economic growth in the
capital city, because many merchants, escaping from the ‘ayya>ru>n,  left
Baghdad to do business in other cities.
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